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Abstract
? This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates ﬁrm
entry under credit rationing. Goods-producing ﬁrms in this model are bank dependent
in the sense that they have no choice but to borrow funds from banks to cover labor
wages that must be paid in advance of production. The results show that a cut in
the policy rate enhances ﬁrm entry by mitigating the severity of credit rationing. This
policy transmission is diﬀerent from the conventional balance-sheet channel in that a
change in the policy rate directly aﬀects borrowers’ credit availability. I also show that
a sudden stop in the credit supply to new ﬁrms is most likely to occur shortly after a
credit boom. This is because endogenous downward wage rigidity prohibits the credit
risk of prospective ﬁrms from decreasing enough to re-equilibrate the loan market.
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1 Introduction
In the face of the recent ﬁnancial turmoil, central banks have paid great attention to the
credit availability of ﬁrms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the
traditional literature on the credit channel of monetary policy, it is widely recognized that
SMEs are more susceptible to shifts in monetary policy compared to large ﬁrms (Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994, Bougheas et al., 2006). Proponents of the bank lending channel
argue that this is because SMEs do not have access to alternative sources of external ﬁnance
such as CP or corporate bonds, which are issued mostly by large ﬁrms. Advocates of the
balance sheet channel, on the other hand, insist that SMEs bear the brunt of a tightening
of monetary policy since SMEs’ external ﬁnance premiums tend to be higher than large
ﬁrms’ (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). A crucial diﬀerence between the balance
sheet channel and the bank lending channel is that, in the former, a rise in the policy rate
does not aﬀect credit availability itself while it reduces SMEs’ demand for external funds.
In this paper I focus on the role of credit availability in monetary policy transmission
and business cycles. Although credit availability has been deemed a key factor in the con-
text of the bank lending channel, the practical validity of this channel has been questioned
since most ﬁnancial institutions in practice can usually raise external funds from the ﬁ-
nancial market in various ways.1 In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1999) “ﬁnancial
accelerator” model, on the other hand, the possibility of credit rationing is precluded for
the purpose of solving the model, so that the credit market is always equilibrated. How-
ever, various kinds of data and empirical studies strongly support the existence of credit
rationing, and some of them report that monetary policy aﬀects the severity of ﬁrms’ credit
availability (e.g., Atanasova and Wilson, 2004, Jime´nez et al., 2010).
Based on Bergin and Corsetti (2005), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2007,
2008), I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates endogenous ﬁrm
entry.2 I assume that each ﬁrm is required to raise funds to cover ﬁxed costs that must be
paid in advance of production. The most important departure from the previous studies is
that ﬁrms have no choice but to obtain credit from ﬁnancial intermediaries to ﬁnance the
ﬁxed costs. Other sources of ﬁnancing, such as equity, commercial papers and corporate
bonds, are unavailable.3 In this environment, whether or not a potential ﬁrm can enter
the market depends fully on the availability of credit.
1See, for example, Bernanke (2007). Ashcraft and Campello (2007) point out that small banks that are
aﬃliated with the same holding company can reallocate funds internally in response to monetary policy
shocks. They conclude that borrowers’ creditworthiness is crucial in determining the volume of bank loans.
2Devereux et al. (1996), Broda and Weinstein (2007) and Bernard, et al. (2006) show that net ﬁrm
entry is procyclical and that a signiﬁcant fraction of output ﬂuctuations is attributable to the creation of
new products and the destruction of existing products.
3As I show below, approximately 90% of SMEs in Japan exploit bank loans as a source of funding.
Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990) provide some reasons why bank lending tends to be the only source of ﬁnancing
for small ﬁrms.
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Following Williamson (1987), Bernanke et al. (1999) and others, ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries must incur auditing costs in order to reveal the state of defaulted ﬁrms (costly state
veriﬁcation). In the presence of auditing costs, there would exist a threshold of loan rates
above which the lender can no longer extend credit.4 If the lending rate is determined at
the threshold value, then some applicants will necessarily be unable to obtain credit. In
fact, the analysis shows that credit rationing arises in equilibrium since prospective en-
trants continue to enter the market until their credit risk becomes too high for ﬁnancial
intermediaries to extend credit. The point is that the creditworthiness of prospective ﬁrms
is decreasing in the mass of ﬁrms because an increase in the amount of labor leads to higher
wages. The mass of new ﬁrms is thus determined at a ﬁnite value even when the expected
proﬁts of entry are still positive.
Since ﬁrms with lower technology are more likely to go bankrupt, the distribution of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology levels would shift over time. As a consequence, the credit spread
tends to become smaller as the ﬁrm ages. Each ﬁrm’s speciﬁc technology will be revealed
only if a bank audit is made while the bank knows the distribution of each generation’s tech-
nology. When solving this model, one needs to keep track of each generation’s technology
distribution and the corresponding mass.
I show that a change in the nominal interest rate has a signiﬁcant impact on real
output through its eﬀect on loan supply. The intuition for this is as follows: suppose
that the central bank cuts the nominal interest rate, which is the cost of funds for ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Since debt contracts are made in nominal terms, a reduction in the nominal
interest rate will allow the ﬁnancial intermediaries to take higher risks. This implies that
a part of the prospective entrants who would otherwise be unable to obtain credit become
able to get credit. Therefore, an expansionary monetary policy enhances new ﬁrm entry and
stimulates aggregate output. This “credit rationing channel” originated by the extensive
margin eﬀect diﬀers from the conventional bank lending channel in that rationing stems
not from the lack of bank liquidity, but from the lack of borrowers’ creditworthiness. In
this sense, the credit rationing channel may be viewed as complementing the traditional
balance sheet channel.
The inﬂuence of monetary policy on ﬁrm dynamics is also explored by Bergin and
Corsetti (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), who assume that new entrants can issue equity to
cover entry costs. In their models, a policy shift can aﬀect each ﬁrm’s entry decision through
its inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s current value as long as price stickiness exists. In contrast, the
real eﬀects of monetary policy considered in this paper do not rely on price stickiness.
Other studies related to this paper are De Fiore and Tristani (2008) and Stebunovs (2008).
De Fiore and Tristani (2008) considered the role of nominal ﬁnancial contract in a model
4Another strand of literature, such as the work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), focuses on adverse selection
between lenders and borrowers as the source of credit rationing. See Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990), Tirole (2006)
and Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a survey of the literature on credit rationing.
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without endogenous entry based on Bernanke et al.’s (1999) model. Stebunovs (2008)
introduced endogenous entry into a DSGE model with banks, but he considered a situation
in which banks’ bargaining power is so strong that they can collect all the ﬁrms’ proﬁts
without incurring auditing costs.
Finally, I examine in what circumstances a “credit crunch” or “credit crisis” is most
likely to occur. In this model, a “credit crunch” or “credit crisis” is deﬁned as a situation
in which bank lending to new entrants suddenly stops. The simulation shows that, in
the midst of a credit boom, a relatively small shock can induce a credit crunch. More
speciﬁcally, a credit crunch tends to follow a signiﬁcant increase in the aggregate output,
the mass of ﬁrms, the amount of credit supplied, aggregate labor, labor wages, TFP, and
sharp declines in default probability and credit spreads. I discuss why these phenomena
can be symptomatic of a credit crisis.
2 SMEs’ credit constraints and the real economy: The case
of Japan
Before proceeding to a formal analysis, this section takes a brief look at the Japanese data
regarding the condition of SMEs’ external ﬁnance and its correlation with the real economy.
2.1 Two types of credit rationing
In general, credit rationing arises for two reasons. One is a borrower’s lack of creditwor-
thiness. If a loan applicant is judged unable to yield a suﬃcient amount of proﬁts in the
future, then the expected net return of lending will be negative and the bank will not
extend credit. Let us call this sort of rationing type-D credit rationing since it stems from
the demand side. The other possibility is that banks cannot extend credit even when the
net expected return of lending is nonnegative. This situation arises either when banks
cannot collect enough funds to lend, as the theory of bank lending channel insists, or when
banks are constrained by bank-capital requirements. Financial institutions that do not
have enough capital are required to control the total amount of loans they make in order
to meet bank-capital requirements.5 If this is the case, the source of SMEs’ diﬃculty in
external ﬁnance stems from banks’ balance sheet condition rather than applicants’ credit-
worthiness. Let us call this type of rationing type-S credit rationing since it is caused by a
supply-side factor.
5Van den Heuvel (2006) investigates the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy when a bank is required to
maintain a certain level of capital.
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2.2 Limited availability of credit for SMEs: Evidence from survey data
A necessary condition for the theoretical analysis of this paper to be valid is that the size
of type-D rationing is economically signiﬁcant. However, showing the existence of credit
rationing is necessarily diﬃcult, as it requires an identiﬁcation of loan demand and loan
supply. While some empirical studies propose various ways to identify loan demand and
loan supply, I show more direct evidence of the presence of rationing using survey data
concerning Japanese SMEs.6
First, I show data taken from the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises,
which is published by the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency every year.
Table 1 reports the proportion of SMEs for which the application of a bank loan has been
denied by their “main banks” in the past year.7 It reveals that at least 6-9% of loan
applicants had their loan application refused or the amount of it reduced. One might
think that this fraction is not signiﬁcant, but there are at least two reasons why this may
be an underestimate. First, there is a strong possibility that there existed “discouraged
borrowers”, who did not apply for loans because they thought they would be rejected
even though they needed funds. Unfortunately, precise data on the number of discouraged
borrowers are not available regarding Japanese SMEs, but the Survey of Small Business
Finances (SSBF) 2003 in the US reports that 17.9% of SMEs were discouraged borrowers.8
The second limitation of the above survey data is that it excludes young ﬁrms that
were launched in the past few years due to the unavailability of real-time information. For
example, the sample ﬁrms included in the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises
2008 are taken from the Establishment and Enterprise Census 2006 published by the
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications.9 It is natural to expect that younger
and smaller ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained than older and larger SMEs. If this is
the case, the extent of credit rationing will be more severe than the above data suggest.
To examine this possibility, Table 2 shows how the availability of credit and the source of
funding depend on ﬁrms’ developmental phases. It states that, among SMEs at the initial
stage of ﬁrm growth, 38.7% answered that they have had some problems with external
ﬁnancing. The corresponding fraction for the most developed SMEs is 2.6%. This strongly
suggests that the fraction of ﬁrms that have diﬃculty in obtaining funds shown in Table 1 is
biased downward due to the fact that the data do not include the youngest SMEs, which are
most likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. Moreover, the table also reveals that the fraction
of loans from ﬁnancial institutions among all sources of ﬁnance is lower for less-developed
6For empirical analyses of credit rationing, see Atanasova and Wilson (2004) and Ciccarelli et al. (2010).
7There can be various deﬁnitions of “main bank”, but the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises
directly asks each SME who its main bank is.
8SSBF 2003 also reports that 85.1% of loan applicants have always been approved and 10.3% have always
been denied.
9This type of information lag varies since the Establishment and Enterprise Census is not conducted
every year. The maximum lag is 4 years.
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SMEs than for developed SMEs. This reﬂects the fact that young ﬁrms are likely to rely
on relatively less eﬃcient sources of funding, such as borrowing from executives, business
partners and relatives. This observation reinforces the view that smaller ﬁrms are more
likely to be credit constrained than larger ﬁrms.
Next, let us look at some judgment surveys taken from TANKAN, which is published
by the Bank of Japan on a quarterly basis. Figure 1 shows the judgment survey of SMEs
on changes in the lending attitudes of ﬁnancial institutions, lending rates and the ease
with which SMEs get external funds (denoted as “ﬁnancial position”). According to these
data, there is a strong correlation between a ﬁnancial institution’s lending attitude and the
ease of external ﬁnance: an accommodative lending attitude makes it easier for ﬁrms to
get external funds. This correlation could be viewed as supporting the model of balance
sheet channel as long as the ease of external ﬁnance stems from changes in the cost of
borrowing. However, the ﬁgure reveals that SMEs’ diﬃculty in external ﬁnance is not
necessarily positively correlated to loan rates. This implies that SMEs do not regard the
cost of borrowing as the only source of ﬁnancing diﬃculty. There must be another reason
why SMEs have problems obtaining external ﬁnance. Time-varying credit availability is
one possible factor that prevents the diﬃculty of external ﬁnance from moving in tandem
with the cost of borrowing.10
Decomposing the observed rationing into type-S and type-D is beyond the scope of
this paper, but some data appear to support the presence of type-D rationing. Table 3
shows that about 50% of SMEs that feel ﬁnancial institutions’ credit standards have risen
attribute this rise to the deterioration of their own proﬁtability, while 43.8% of SMEs
reported that the increasing diﬃculty in obtaining external funds stems from the ﬁnancial
institutions’ problems. In addition, as is shown in Table 2, the fact that the fraction of
SMEs that have some problems with external ﬁnancing declines with ﬁrm age implies that
the availability of credit depends largely on demand-side factors.
In the model presented below, I examine the relationship between ﬁrm entry and credit
availability. As pointed out by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) among others, the terminology
“ﬁrm entry” could also be interpreted as the establishment of new plants or investments.
If a certain fraction of ﬁrms are credit constrained, then the ease of external ﬁnance is
expected to have a positive correlation with the number of new ﬁrm entries and investments.
Figure 2 shows this is indeed the case. There is a strong positive correlation between the
number of newly launched ﬁrms, SMEs’ ﬁxed investments and the ease of obtaining external
ﬁnance.
10Lown and Morgan (2002, 2006) stress the importance of credit standards, as opposed to loan rates,
in explaining the behavior of bank loans, real GDP and inventory investment in the U.S. They show that
credit standards, as a proxy for credit availability, are far more informative than loan rates about the total
amount of loans.
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3 The model
The model economy consists of a representative household, goods-producing ﬁrms, a ﬁ-
nancial intermediary, a central bank, and the government. The representative household
consumes a variety of goods while supplying labor service in the goods sector. Since the
mass of ﬁrms is allowed to vary over time, the goods ﬁrms can be classiﬁed into two groups:
new entrants and incumbents. Firms have to employ a ﬁxed amount of labor in order to
make preparations for production at the beginning of each period. Accordingly, they need
to raise funds in the ﬁnancial market in advance of production to cover the ﬁxed costs.
I consider a situation in which bank lending is the only source of ﬁnancing. Unlike the
standard endogenous entry models, equity issuing is not allowed. Since renegotiation of
debt contract is not permitted, a ﬁrm goes bankrupt if it fails to earn enough proﬁts to
repay the principal plus interest to the ﬁnancial intermediary. The sequence of events is
illustrated in Figure 4.
3.1 Households
The one-period utility function of a representative household is given as
Ut = logCt − η
∫
i∈Ωt
Lt(i)1+φ
1 + φ
di− η˜
∫
i∈Ωt
ft(i)1+φ˜
1 + φ˜
di φ, φ˜, η, η˜ ≥ 0
where Ct ≡
[∫
i∈Ωt Ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 , and Ct(i) and Lt(i) are the consumption of diﬀer-
entiated good i and the hours worked for the production of consumption good i, re-
spectively. θ (> 1) denotes the elasticity of substitution between the variety of goods.
The optimization of the allocation of consumption goods yields the aggregate price index
Pt ≡
[∫
i∈Ωt Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ , where Pt(i) denotes the price of good i. Ωt is the set of the
total variety of goods available in period t. ft(i) represents the hours worked for ﬁrm i at
the beginning of period t in preparation for production. I assume that a certain amount
of preparatory work needs to be done at the beginning of each period in order to begin
production. The point is that the preparatory work is a requisite for production, so that
ft(i) is not necessarily positively correlated with the realized amount of products. Practical
examples of this type of “non-productive” but requisite work would be personnel manage-
ment, test marketing, negotiation with banks in obtaining credit, etc. The necessity of
hiring those preparatory workers requires ﬁrms to incur ﬁxed costs, which must be paid in
advance of production.
The household needs to use cash to purchase consumption goods. At the begin-
ning of period t, the amount of cash available for the purchase of consumption goods
is Mt +
∫
i∈Ωt W˜t(i)ft(i)di− St, where Mt is the nominal balance held from period t− 1 to
t, and
∫
i∈Ωt W˜t(i)ft(i)di represents the total nominal preparatory-labor wage paid at the
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beginning of period t. The production-labor wage
∫
i∈Ωt Wt(i)Lt(i)di is paid after produc-
tion has started. The household also makes a one-period deposit St at the beginning of
the period and the interest on it, Rt, is paid at the end of the period. It follows that the
following cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint must be satisﬁed:11
PtCt ≤ Mt +
∫
i∈Ωt
W˜t(i)ft(i)di− St.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
Mt+1 = Mt +
∫
i∈Ωt
W˜t(i)ft(i)di− St − PtCt + RtSt +
∫
i∈Ωt
Wt(i)Lt(i)di +Πt − Tt
where Πt denotes the sum of proﬁts transferred from ﬁrms and the ﬁnancial intermediary,
and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the government. Since the CIA constraint holds with
equality in each period as long as there is an opportunity cost of holding cash, the budget
constraint can be rewritten as:
PtCt + St =
∫
i∈Ωt
W˜t(i)ft(i)di + Rt−1St−1 +
∫
i∈Ωt−1
Wt−1(i)Lt−1(i)di +Πt−1 − Tt−1.
Due to the CIA constraint, the production-labor wage income in period t,
∫
i∈Ωt Wt(i)Lt(i)di,
cannot be used until period t+1, while the preparatory-labor wage income,
∫
i∈Ωt W˜t(i)ft(i)di,
can be spent in period t.
Assume for simplicity that the amount of labor required for the preparation of produc-
tion depends solely on the status of the ﬁrm: new entrant or incumbent. New entrants and
incumbents hire preparatory-labor fE,t and fI,t, respectively. The ﬁrst-order conditions
for the household’s optimization problem are
R−1t = Et
βPtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
, (1)
W˜E,t
Pt
= η˜Ctf
φ˜
E,t,
W˜I,t
Pt
= η˜Ctf
φ˜
I,t (2)
βEt
Wt(i)
Pt+1Ct+1
= ηLφt (i), (3)
where β and Et are the subjective discount factor and the expectations operator conditional
on information in period t. W˜E,t and W˜I,t are the nominal preparatory-labor wages for
new entrants and incumbents, respectively. Conditions (1) and (2) are fairly standard.
Eq.(3) says that the current disutility of labor must equal the real wage evaluated in
terms of future price level and future marginal utility of consumption. This is because
the production-labor wages cannot be spent until the next period, whereas the household
11It is assumed that ﬁnancial markets open before the goods market.
7
incurs disutility of labor today. Using the Euler equation (1), this relation can be rewritten
as
Wt(i)
Pt
= ηRtCtL
φ
t (i). (4)
Eq. (4) is a labor supply condition that equates the real wage to the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. However, unlike the standard one, the
nominal interest rate Rt also appears in the relation. The presence of Rt represents the
distortion stemming from the time lag between the earning and spending of wage income.
As demonstrated below, the nominal interest rate has a real impact on the economy due to
this time lag. An intuitive reason for the appearance of the nominal interest rate in (4) is as
follows. In the optimal equilibrium, the current disutility of labor must equal the “future
real wage”, Wt(i)/Pt+1, times the future marginal utility of consumption, C−1t+1. On the
one hand, the diﬀerence between the current real wage, Wt(i)/Pt, and “future real wage” is
given by the rate of inﬂation. On the other hand, the Euler equation (1) suggests that the
diﬀerence between the current and future marginal utility of consumption is given by the
real rate of interest. Therefore, when the optimality condition (3) is expressed exclusively
by time-t variables, the inﬂation terms oﬀset each other and only the nominal interest rate
term remains.
3.2 Goods sector
The production function of a goods-producing ﬁrm takes the form of a constant-returns-
to-scale function:
Yt(i) = (Zt + z(i))Lt(i), (5)
where Yt(i), Zt and z(i) ∈ (0, zu) denote output, a common productivity shock and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity level, respectively. While the common productivity level is allowed to
change over time, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology is not. Zt takes a positive value for all t.
There are three economic agents who consume goods: the household, the government
and the ﬁnancial intermediary. The ﬁnancial intermediary is a consumer of goods since
auditing costs take the form of consumption spending. All agents have an identical elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods, which means that they will demand the same
consumption basket. It follows that the goods demand function is simply given by
Yt(i) = ρ−θt (i)Yt, (6)
where ρt(i) = Pt(i)/Pt and Yt = Ct + Gt + ξt. Gt and ξt denote the consumption baskets
purchased by the government and the ﬁnancial intermediary, respectively. In the follow-
ing, I assume that government spending is determined such that Ct = γYt and hence
Gt + ξt = (1 − γ)Yt, where γ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that ﬂuctuations in ξt are completely
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absorbed by the corresponding shift in government spending so as to keep the household’s
consumption a constant fraction of aggregate output. The reason for imposing this as-
sumption is twofold: ﬁrst, it is natural to consider that the contribution of auditing costs
incurred by ﬁnancial institutions to GDP is negligible compared to that of household con-
sumption and government spending. Second, this simpliﬁcation enables us to analytically
prove the existence and uniqueness of ﬁnancial market equilibrium. Without this assump-
tion, there arise trivial second- and higher-order eﬀects of a change in ξt on output. This
is because ξt depends on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, which depend on aggregate output, which in turn
depends on ξt, and so forth.
Goods prices are ﬂexible. The relative price of good i is then given as
ρt(i) =
(
θ
θ − 1
)
Wt(i)
Pt(Zt + z(i))
. (7)
Using (4) - (7) and the relation Yt =
[∫
i∈Ωt Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 , the aggregate output can be
expressed as
Yt =
[(
θ
θ − 1
)
γηRt
] −1
1+φ
[∫
i∈Ωt
(Zt + z(i))αdi
] 1
α
=
[(
θ
θ − 1
)
γηRt
] −1
1+φ
[∫ zu
0
Jt(z)(Zt + z)αdz
] 1
α
, (8)
where α ≡ (θ− 1)(1+ φ)/(1+ θφ), and Jt(z) denotes the mass of ﬁrms whose ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity is z. As is clear from the equation, an increase in the mass of ﬁrms will expand
the aggregate output, and a reduction in the nominal interest rate will also have a positive
impact on output. As I mentioned above, the latter eﬀect stems simply from the time lag
between the payment and the usage of production-labor wages.
Let dt(i) denote the real proﬁt prior to repayment to the ﬁnancial intermediary.12 The
diversity in dt(i) among ﬁrms can be expressed solely by the diﬀerence in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technology:
dt(i) =
1
θ
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ Y
1
θ
t
=
1
θ
(Zt + z(i))α
[(
θ
θ − 1
)
γηRt
] −1
1+φ
[∫ zu
0
Jt(z)(Zt + z)αdz
] 1−α
α
, (9)
Notice that an increase in the mass of ﬁrms, which is reﬂected by a rise in
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt+
z)αdz, may or may not improve the proﬁtability of each ﬁrm, depending on the value of α.
This is because an increase in the mass of ﬁrms will raise the real wages while expanding
aggregate demand. If the former eﬀect dominates the latter, then proﬁts will decrease as
the mass of ﬁrms rises.
12Firms pay the right amount of wages to production workers before paying back to the ﬁnancial inter-
mediary. Note that this is always possible since dt(i) is nonnegative.
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It is assumed that hours worked at the beginning of period t as a preparatory worker
are fE,t = fE/Zt for entrants and fI,t = fI/Zt for incumbents. fE and fI are assumed
to be constant. This speciﬁcation implies that the ﬁxed costs will decrease as common
productivity improves.
3.3 Financial intermediary
Let us turn to the ﬁnancial contract between a ﬁrm and a ﬁnancial intermediary.13 After a
common productivity shock Zt is realized, each ﬁrm attempts to borrow funds from a ﬁnan-
cial intermediary in order to pay ﬁxed costs W˜E,tfE,t or W˜I,tfI,t. Firm-speciﬁc technology
is not observable to the ﬁnancial intermediary unless an audit is made after bankruptcy.
Firms cannot raise capital in other ways, such as equity, trade credits, corporate bonds, or
commercial paper.
3.3.1 New entrants
First, let us consider a debt contract between a new entrant and a ﬁnancial intermediary.
Every debt contract is made in nominal terms. The gross lending rate, RlE,t, is determined
according to the following no-arbitrage condition:
(1− xE,t)RlE,tW˜E,tfE,t + (1− μE)
∫ z¯E,t
0
g(z)Ptdt(z)dz = χtRtW˜E,tfE,t, μE ∈ (0, 1) (10)
where z¯E,t denotes the threshold of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity below which ﬁrms go into
bankruptcy. xE,t is the probability of new entrants’ default and g(z) is the density function
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology levels. χt ≥ 1 represents a shock that would aﬀect the ﬁnancial
contract. A plausible interpretation of this shock would be a shift in the credit standard.
For instance, a change in the bank’s risk aversion and/or the expected proﬁtability of
borrowers will aﬀect the bank’s lending attitude. As in Williamson (1987) and Bernanke
et al. (1999), the ﬁnancial intermediary has to incur auditing costs in order to reveal
the state of defaulted ﬁrms. As is well known, in the presence of such costs, there would
arise a threshold of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology above which the lender can no longer grant
credit. This is because a rise in the threshold will increase the probability of default
and thereby increase the expected cost of auditing while a rise in the threshold has a
direct positive eﬀect on the bank’s revenue through a rise in the lending rate. Following
Bernanke et al. (1999), I assume that the auditing costs take a form such that the ﬁnancial
intermediary spends a certain fraction of its revenue on ﬁnal goods consumption. This
leads to ξE,t = μE
∫ z¯E,t
0 g(z)dt(z)dz. An advantage of this speciﬁcation of auditing costs
is that the ﬁnancial intermediary always has an incentive to audit since auditing is always
beneﬁcial. Since prospective entrants are ex ante identical, the ﬁnancial intermediary
assigns an identical loan rate to all entrants.
13I use the terms “ﬁnancial intermediary” and “bank” interchangeably.
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There exist at least two sorts of ﬁnancial market imperfections here. One is the presence
of auditing costs, whose role of have been occasionally discussed in the literature. The other
is the unavailability of additional liquidity at the end of each period. If ﬁnancial markets
were perfect, then the ﬁnancial intermediary would try to avoid having ﬁrms default by
extending additional credit as long as the ﬁrms would be able to earn positive net proﬁts
in the future. In such a situation, ﬁrms could get the same amount of external funds
as their discounted value of expected proﬁts, and thereby the ﬁnancial market structure
would basically be the same as that of the standard endogenous entry models (Bilbiie
et al., 2007, 2008) where equity issuing is allowed. However, this model does not allow
for renegotiation, and thus the ﬁnancial intermediary commits to the original contract by
letting the defaulting ﬁrms exit from the market.14 This unavailability of additional credit,
as well as the presence of auditing costs, will keep the mass of new entrants below the
frictionless level.
As a preparation for analyzing equilibrium dynamics, let us express eq.(10) in terms of
threshold z¯E,t and the mass function J(·). The threshold of default is deﬁned implicitly as
Ptdt(z¯E,t) = RlE,tW˜E,tfE,t. (11)
It follows that the probability of default, xE,t, can be given as
xE,t = Prob(Ptdt(z) < RlE,tW˜E,tfE,t)
= Prob(z < z¯E,t)
= G(z¯E,t),
where G(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of idiosyncratic technology levels.
Then, eq.(10) leads to
(1−G(z¯E,t))dt(z¯E,t) + (1− μE)
∫ z¯E,t
0
g(z)dt(z)dz =
χtRtW˜E,tfE,t
Pt
,
Or, owing to the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the ﬁnancial contract can be expressed
in a simpler form by eliminating terms that are common to both sides of the equation.
(1−G(z¯E,t))(Zt + z¯E,t)α + (1− μE)
∫ z¯E,t
0
g(z)(Zt + z)αdz
= χtRtθη˜γf
1+φ˜
E,t
∫ zu
0
Jt(z)(Zt + z)αdz. (12)
14The introduction of renegotiation will change the static ﬁnancial contract into a dynamic one. However,
as will be made clear below, such forward-lookingness makes it quite diﬃcult to solve the model since
technology distribution changes over time. Although I do not specify a particular microfounded rationale
for why the ﬁnancial intermediary refuses to extend further credit to ﬁrms in default, various reasons were
proposed in the previous studies. For instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) insisted that a credible threat of
cutting oﬀ credit will reduce the likelihood that the borrowers undertake risky projects. Jaﬀee and Stiglitz
(1990) provide a brief review of studies on this topic.
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Notice that the “time-lag eﬀect” regarding wage income has no impact on this ﬁnancial
contract since the term R
− 1
1+φ
t appears in every term of eq.(10) and they cancel out each
other. The LHS and RHS of (12) can be interpreted as the “quasi-expected revenue” and
the “quasi-cost of funds”, respectively. For later use, let us deﬁne Γ(z¯E,t;Zt) as follows:
Γ(z¯E,t;Zt) ≡ (1−G(z¯E,t))(Zt + z¯E,t)α + (1− μE)
∫ z¯E,t
0
g(z)(Zt + z)αdz.
From the deﬁnition of the threshold z¯E,t, the loan rate can be written as
RlE,t =
dt(z¯E,t)
(W˜E,t/Pt)fE,t
=
(Zt + z¯Et)α
θη˜γf1+φ˜E,t
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt + z)
αdz
= χtRt
(Zt + z¯Et)α
Γ(z¯E,t;Zt)
≥ χtRt. (13)
Thus, the minimum value of the entrants’ loan rate is necessarily equal to or higher than
the safe rate, depending on the realization of ﬁnancial shock χt.
An important point is that the equilibrium condition (12) holds only under “normal”
circumstances. If aggregate shocks are moderate, then the mass J(·) is determined such
that condition (12) holds with equality through the adjustment of the mass of new entrants.
However, if large unfavorable aggregate shocks hit the economy, then it becomes possible
that the adjustment of J(·) may fail to satisfy condition (12) because the mass of new
entrants is nonnegative. In that circumstance, no prospective entrants can get credit since
the expected revenue becomes smaller than the bank’s cost of funds. This possibility will
be thoroughly examined in later sections.
3.3.2 Incumbents
By deﬁnition, incumbents survived the last period. This implies that the lower bound
of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology distribution generally shifts rightward as the ﬁrm ages,
since those ﬁrms that have inferior technologies are more likely to go bankrupt and exit
from the market. The ﬁnancial intermediary does not know each incumbent’s technology
level. What is known to the ﬁnancial intermediary is the technology distribution of each
generation. Individual loans may be exposed to some risk while there is no aggregate
uncertainty. The loan rates of older ﬁrms are likely to be lower than those of younger
ﬁrms.
Let z¯qI,t−1 denote the lower bound of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology levels of generation-q,
which is a predetermined variable at t . By generation-q, I mean the ﬁrms that entered
the market q periods ago. A debt contract will be made if the following condition is met:
(1− xqI,t)Rl,qI,tW˜I,tfI,t + (1− μI)
∫ z¯1+qI,t
z¯qI,t−1
gqt−1(z)Ptdt(z)dz ≥ χtRtW˜I,tfI,t, μI ∈ (0, 1) (14)
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where xqI,t and g
q
t−1(·) denote the probability of default and the density function of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc technologies of generation-q, respectively. Thus, xqI,t =
∫ z¯1+qI,t
z¯qI,t−1
gqt−1(z)dz ≡ Gqt−1(z¯1+qI,t ).
The ﬁnancial contract will determine z¯1+qI,t ≥ z¯qI,t−1 so as to attain (14) with equality. If
any value of z¯1+qI,t ≥ z¯qI,t−1 cannot attain equality, which occurs when the expected revenue
always exceeds the cost of funds, then z¯1+qI,t = z¯
q
I,t−1. In this case, the generation-q ﬁrms
are no longer risky borrowers and that they can obtain credit at the lowest rate, χtRt.
As in the case of new entrants, the ﬁnancial contract can be simpliﬁed as
z¯1+qI,t ≥ z¯qI,t−1 if Γq(z¯1+qI,t ;Zt) = χtRtθη˜γf1+φ˜I,t
∫ zu
0
Jt(z)(Zt + z)αdz
z¯1+qI,t = z¯
q
I,t−1 if Γ
q(z¯1+qI,t ;Zt) > χtRtθη˜γf
1+φ˜
I,t
∫ zu
0
Jt(z)(Zt + z)αdz, (15)
where
Γq(z¯1+qI,t ;Zt) ≡ (1−Gqt−1(z¯1+qI,t ))(Zt + z¯1+qI,t )α + (1− μI)
∫ z¯1+qI,t
z¯qI,t−1
gqt−1(z)(Zt + z)
αdz.
Again, there is another possibility that Γq(z¯1+qI,t ;Zt) < χtRtθη˜γf
1+φ˜
I,t
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt +
z)αdz. If this is the case, some of the incumbents are forced to exit from the market since
they cannot obtain credit required to begin production. As is discussed below, however,
I do not treat this possibility because there is a technical diﬃculty in obtaining a unique
solution.
3.3.3 Financial market equilibrium
Since the central bank injects money into the ﬁnancial intermediary at the beginning of
each period, the ﬁnancial market equilibrium condition is given as
NEt W˜E,tfE,t + N
I
t W˜I,tfI,t = St +ΔMt+1,
where ΔMt+1 ≡ Mt+1−Mt and NEt and N It denote the mass of entrants and incumbents,
respectively. The proﬁts of the ﬁnancial intermediary are transferred to the household at
the end of the period.
4 Firm dynamics and the role of credit rationing
4.1 Firm entry condition
There is an inﬁnite mass of prospective entrants, and they will try to enter the market if
and only if the discounted value of the expected proﬁts is positive. In this model, however,
the bank will not extend credit if the ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts are negative. Thus, those
ﬁrms that would be able to obtain credit automatically satisfy the entry condition. Clearly,
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positive expected proﬁts are not a suﬃcient condition for the prospective entrants to be
able to obtain credit. Because the bank has to incur some auditing costs, the bank lending
standards are more severe than the simple zero proﬁt condition.
4.2 Equilibrium credit rationing
Since prospective entrants have nothing to lose, their net beneﬁt is zero if they go bankrupt.
This implies that ﬁrm entry continues as long as bank credit is available. The question is:
how can the mass of ﬁrms be determined at a ﬁnite value?
The total demand for funds is basically inﬁnite since an unbounded mass of prospective
ﬁrms tries to enter the market. Thus, the determination of the mass of new entrants
depends fully on credit availability. In other words, there is always room for an “eﬀective
supply” of funds as long as the mass of ﬁrms is ﬁnite.15
In order to see how the mass of ﬁrms is determined, we have to see eq. (12) in more
detail. First of all, in order to exclude a trivial situation in which the probability of default
is one, the LHS of (12), Γ(z¯E,t;Zt), must have a global maximum at z¯E,t = z¯∗E,t < zu. If
this is not the case, it is optimal for the ﬁnancial intermediary to set z¯E,t at zu so that
no ﬁrm will be able to survive. In fact, whether this is the case or not depends on the
distribution of idiosyncratic technologies.16 In the following, I assume that new entrants’
ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology levels are uniformly distributed over [0, zu].
The ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation of Γ(z¯E,t;Zt) with respect to z¯E,t leads to
Γ′(z¯E,t;Zt) = (Zt + z¯E,t)α
[
α(1−G(z¯E,t))(Zt + z¯E,t)−1 − μEg(z¯E,t)
]
= (Zt + z¯E,t)α
[
α(1− z¯E,t
zu
)(Zt + z¯E,t)−1 − μE
zu
]
. (16)
It follows that Γ(z¯E,t;Zt) attains the global maximum at
ˆ¯zE,t =
αzu − μEZt
α + μE
. (17)
Recall that the bank will lend funds as long as the equilibrium condition (12) is satisﬁed.
An increase in the mass of ﬁrms following the granting of a bank loan is reﬂected by an
increase in the value of
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt +z)
αdz since the mass J(·) changes as new ﬁrms enter
the market. More and more ﬁrms will be entering the market until a threshold is reached
where a slight rise in the mass of ﬁrms would prohibit (12) from holding with equality.
The probability of default turns out to be less than one since ˆ¯zE,t < zu implies μE(zu +
Zt) > 0, which holds as long as there is a positive auditing cost. On the other hand, ˆ¯zE,t
15The practical importance of “eﬀective supply” was stressed by Blinder (1987).
16Bernanke et al. (1999) assumed that the distribution of idiosyncratic technology levels has a decreasing-
hazard property in order to eliminate the situation in which the probability of default is one in equilibrium.
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must be greater than zero to ensure xE,t > 0, which requires Zt < αzu/μE . Therefore, the
equilibrium threshold is attained at z¯∗E,t deﬁned as follows:
z¯∗E,t = max
{
0,
αzu − μEZt
α + μE
}
.
Figure 4 illustrates the loan market equilibrium. Depending on the sizes of shocks,
there are two possible cases prior to ﬁrm entry. The ﬁrst situation is that the quasi-cost of
funds, RHS of (12), lies below the maximum of quasi-expected revenue, Γ(z¯∗E,t;Zt) (CC).
In this case, the debt contract would be made at B provided that the mass of total ﬁrms
was unchanged.17 In fact, the mass of total ﬁrms will instantly increase until the quasi-cost
line reaches Γ(z¯∗E,t;Zt). In equilibrium, the mass of new entrants equalizes the quasi-cost
of funds with Γ(z¯∗E,t;Zt).
CC in ﬁgure 4 corresponds to the situation in which the ﬁnancial intermediary can
increase its credit supply due to either a decline in the cost of funds or an increase in the
expected revenue (after subtracting auditing costs). In either case, the default risk will be
reduced prior to the start of ﬁrm entry, so that the ﬁnancial intermediary becomes able
to extend more credit than before. Another possible situation is that the cost of funds is
greater than the expected revenue (DD). No prospective entrants can get funds, so that
the mass of total ﬁrms must decrease. This leads to a decline in the mass of new entrants.
The intuition for the determination of the mass of new ﬁrms is given as follows: prospec-
tive entrants continue to enter the market as long as they can obtain credit. On the other
hand, the ﬁnancial intermediary will extend credit only if the expected proﬁts are nonneg-
ative. At this point, it is important to notice that an increase in the mass of total ﬁrms
will raise real wages through the increased disutility of labor. A rise in real wages itself
makes the creditworthiness of borrowers worse since the amount of products is indepen-
dent of the preparatory works. Therefore, the more new ﬁrms enter the market, the worse
the creditworthiness of borrowers. This externality of bank lending makes it possible to
uniquely pin down the mass of total ﬁrms as the bank becomes unable to extend credit at
some level of the mass of ﬁrms.
In the literature, this type of credit rationing is called “pure credit rationing” (Jaﬀee
and Stiglitz, 1990) or “type-II credit rationing” (Keeton, 1979), where some people can get
the full amount of credit they demand while apparently identical people cannot.18 In this
model, the aggregate output will be stimulated by the eﬀective supply of liquidity to those
prospective entrants who failed to obtain credit. Notice that the source of rationing is
not related to the bank’s ﬁnancial position. This is a situation in which banks can obtain
17Note that the right intersection does not make sense since the ﬁnancial intermediary can earn positive
proﬁts by lowering the threshold.
18In contrast, the presence of a binding collateral constraint is an example of type-I rationing, where
some agents cannot get the desired amount of credit.
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external funds as much as they want, and there is no regulation on the volume of loans.
Hence, this situation corresponds to the type-D credit rationing discussed in section 2.
4.3 Incumbents’ default risk
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate how z¯1+qI,t is determined. I assume that μE > μI and fE < fI .
These two assumptions locate the incumbents’ quasi-revenue and the quasi-cost curves
above those of the entrants, and the maximizer of the incumbents’ quasi-revenue curve
becomes larger than that of the entrants. This makes it possible to obtain a time-invariant
long-run distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology levels.
Figure 5 explains the case in which incumbents of generation-q are risky borrowers. If
the intersection of the hump-shaped curve and the horizontal line is located to the right of
the generation’s lowest technology level, where z¯1+qI,t > z¯
q
I,t−1, then the generation-q ﬁrms
will default with probability xqI,t =
z¯1+qI,t −z¯qI,t−1
zu−z¯qI,t−1
. On the other hand, if there is no left-hand
intersection, then z¯1+qI,t = z¯
q
I,t−1 (ﬁgure 6). The latter situation implies that even ﬁrms that
have the lowest technology among the corresponding generation will be able to pay back
the full amount they owe. Thus all the ﬁrms that belong to the generation can obtain
credit at the lowest rate, χtRt.19 The loan rate oﬀered to the generation-q ﬁrms can be
summarized as
Rl,qI,t =
dt(z¯
1+q
I,t )
(W˜I,t/Pt)fI,t
> χtRt if z¯
1+q
I,t > z¯
q
I,t−1
= χtRt if z¯
1+q
I,t = z¯
q
I,t−1.
4.4 Firm dynamics and heterogeneity in technology
Since the threshold of default depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology, the aggregate technology
distribution generally changes over time. We need to keep track of each generation’s
mass and the lower bound of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology. This section describes how the
distributional dynamics of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology are calculated. As Bartelsman and
Doms (2000) indicate using industrial micro-data, in practice there exists a signiﬁcant
degree of technology heterogeneity among ﬁrms, and new ﬁrms are generally less productive
than older ﬁrms.
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state at t = 0. At time t = 1, the integral
19One might think that no-risk ﬁrms can borrow at the safe rate Rt. I assume that the lowest loan rate
is χtRt in order to keep the continuity of loan rates around z¯
1+q
I,t = z¯
q
I,t−1. Notice that if z¯
1+q
I,t is a little
greater than z¯qI,t−1, then R
l,q
I,t is approximately equal to χtRt.
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of the technology level relevant to the aggregate variables is expressed as20
∫ zu
0
J1(z)(Zt + z)αdz =
∫ zu
zˆI1
H1(z)(Zt + z)αdz + NE1
∫ zu
0
g(z)(Zt + z)αdz,
where ∫ zu
zˆI1
H1(z)(Zt + z)αdz = (1− xI,0)(1− δ)N I0
∫ zu
z¯I,0
h0(z)(Zt + z)αdz
+(1− xE,0)NE0
∫ zu
z¯E,0
g10(z)(Zt + z)
αdz. (18)
Ht(z) denotes the mass of incumbent ﬁrms whose technology is z, and zˆIt is the minimum
value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology among all incumbents at t. h0(z) is the density function of
incumbents’ technology in the steady state. In period t = 0, all incumbents are uniformly
distributed on [z¯I,0, zu]. The incumbents’ technology distribution in period 1 is the same
as that in period 0 if z¯I,0 = z¯E,0. It follows that h0(z) = g10(z) for all z, and xI,0 = 0. As
in previous studies, incumbents are assumed to suﬀer from a “death shock” at the end of
each period with probability δ (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005, Bilbiie et al., 2007, 2008). The
mass of incumbents in period 1 leads to:
N I1 = (1− δ)N I0 + (1− xE,0)NE0 .
The corresponding equations in period 2 are as follows:
∫ zu
0
J2(z)(Zt + z)αdz =
∫ zu
zˆI2
H2(z)(Zt + z)αdz + NE2
∫ zu
0
g(z)(Zt + z)αdz, (19)
where∫ zu
zˆI2
H2(z)(Zt + z)αdz = (1− x1I,1)(1− δ)2N I0
∫ zu
z¯2I,1
g21(z)(Zt + z)
αdz
+(1− xE,0)(1− x1I,1)(1− δ)NE0
∫ zu
z¯2I,1
g21(z)(Zt + z)
αdz
+(1− xE,1)NE1
∫ zu
z¯E,1
g11(z)(Zt + z)
αdz. (20)
It follows that
N I2 = (1− x1I,1)(1− δ)2N I0 + (1− xE,0)(1− x1I,1)(1− δ)NE0 + (1− xE,1)NE1 .
In this way, we can keep track of aggregate technology distribution by following each
generation’s distribution and mass. Although most of the previous models that introduced
20Notice that the relevant aggregate productivity can be expressed as
 
i∈Ω1(Z1 + z(i))
αdi =
 
i∈I1(Z1 +
z(i))αdi +
 
i∈E1(Z1 + z(i))
αdz, where I1 and E1 denote the sets of indices for incumbents and entrants in
period 1, respectively. Firms share the same technology distribution among the same generation.
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productivity heterogeneity focus on the long-run equilibrium where technology distribution
does not change, this model makes it possible to treat dynamic distributional shifts.21
As mentioned above, there exists a possibility that incumbents, as well as new entrants,
will be credit rationed under certain circumstances. There are three possible phases in
regard to the condition of bank lending: i) entrants are credit rationed while incumbents
are not. ii) No prospective entrants can obtain credit, whereas incumbents can. iii) No
prospective entrants can obtain credit and some of the incumbents are credit rationed. As
for case iii), a diﬃcult issue is which generation of incumbents should be excluded from
the market. This decision is necessarily arbitrary, since re-equilibration of condition (15)
only requires a reduction in
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt +z)
αdz. This is made possible if a certain mass of
incumbents exit as a whole, so that it does not matter which generations the exiting ﬁrms
belong to. For this reason, I will only treat cases i) and ii).
5 Summary of the model
In the following, I solve the model focusing on the following variables: z¯E,t, {z¯1+qI,t }tq=1,
xE,t, {xqI,t}tq=1,
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt+z)
αdz,
∫ zu
0 Ht(z)(Zt+z)
αdz, NEt , N It , Nt, Yt, dt(z¯E), W˜E,t/Pt,
W˜I,t/Pt, R
l
E,t and {Rq,lI,t}tq=1. The rest of the endogenous aggregate variables, such as the
real interest rate, can be determined residually.
As for the process of exogenous shocks, I employ the following simple autoregressive
process:
Zt = exp(εzt )Z
ρz
t−1Z
1−ρz ,
Rt = exp(εrt )R
ρr
t−1R
1−ρr ,
χt = exp(ε
χ
t )χ
ρχ
t−1χ
1−ρχ ,
where Z, R and χ denote the steady-state values of common productivity shock, the
nominal interest rate and the ﬁnancial shock, respectively. εit, i = z, r, χ, represent iid
shocks to the corresponding variable.
If one focuses on the endogenous variables listed above, the model can be solved ana-
lytically in a recursive manner without relying on any linearization technique. The steady
states of those variables are summarized in the Appendix.22
21See, for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Gomes (2001). Recall that the model’s tractabil-
ity depends largely on its backward-looking nature. If forward-lookingness is introduced, an approximation
method will be needed in order to obtain aggregate dynamics (e.g., Krusell and Smith 1998).
22Since the process of nominal interest rate is exogenously given, the aggregate price level will be inde-
terminate as long as the public forms rational expectations (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Notice that the
aggregate price level is not necessarily indeterminate if the public’s expectation formation is not rational.
The public’s expectation formation is left unspeciﬁed in this model.
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6 Numerical experiments
6.1 Calibration
The model’s frequency is quarterly. The baseline parameter values are as follows: for the
utility parameter, φ = 2, φ˜ = 1, η = η˜ = 1, and β = .99. R is set at 1/.99. The auditing
cost parameters μE and μI are set at .12 and .08, respectively.23 The consumption-GDP
ratio, γ, is .6 and the mean of the common productivity shock is set at 1. Following Bilbiie
et al. (2007, 2008), I employ θ = 3.8. The steady-state preparatory labor, fE, is determined
such that it equals the “average” individual production labor, which corresponds to the
hours worked under productivity of Z + zu/2. This results in
fE =
{
Γ(z¯E)
Rθη˜γ
[
A1+φ(Z +
zu
2
)−α
]}1/(φ˜−φ)
,
where A ≡ [θ/(θ − 1)ηγR]1/(1+φ). fI is set such that the steady-state threshold of new
entrants’ default is identical to the lower bound of the incumbents’ technology distribution
in the steady state. It follows that
(Z + z¯I)α
Γ(z¯E)
=
(
fI
fE
)1+φ˜
or fI = fE
[
(Z + z¯I)α
Γ(z¯E)
] 1
1+φ˜
.
This implies that fE < fI .
Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2008) set δ at .025 to match the U.S. data for job destruction, which
is approximately 10% per year. Because there is no incumbents default in the steady state,
I set the value of zu such that xE = δ. This results in zu = .126. The total exit rate in
the steady state is equal to the total entry rate, thus NE/N = δ. With these parameter
values, the steady state entrants’ annual credit spread, deﬁned as (RlE/R)
4 − 1, is 1.22%.
The AR coeﬃcients ρz and ρr are both set at .9. As for the ﬁnancial shock, it is assumed
that χ = 1 and χt is a temporary shock whose AR coeﬃcient is zero.
6.2 Impulse responses
As discussed above, the eﬀects of economic shocks are highly asymmetric and dependent
on the sizes of the shocks. Thus, I ﬁrst show impulse responses to moderate shocks. After
that, I examine the case of large shocks that will break down the equilibrium condition of
debt contracts.
23Bernanke, et al. (1999) set μ at .12.
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6.2.1 A common productivity shock
The direct eﬀect of Zt on the quasi-cost of funds is twofold. First, a rise in Zt decreases the
quantity of each ﬁrm’s demand for funds by reducing the required preparatory labor. This
is reﬂected by a downward shift of the horizontal line. Second, a rise in Zt increases the
term
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt + z)
αdz. On the other hand, a positive productivity shock also moves
the quasi-expected revenue, Γ(·), upward, which corresponds to an improvement in the
proﬁtability of borrowers.
Figure 7 illustrates impulse responses to a positive (annualized) one-percent deviation
of the common productivity shock from the steady state. The path of each variable is
shown in terms of the percentage deviation from the corresponding steady state.24 The
ﬁgures show that an improvement in the common productivity level enhances ﬁrm entry
and that the entrants’ probability of default is lowered. Graphically, this reﬂects a shift
in the quasi-revenue curve in the upper-left direction. However, the average probability
of incumbents’ default signiﬁcantly increases in period 2. This is because those ﬁrms that
entered in period 1 have lower technologies on average than the incumbents in the steady
state do. An improvement in the common technology allows the threshold of new entrants
to decrease, so that the average incumbent productivity necessarily deteriorates in the
following periods.
Figure 8 illustrates impulse responses to a negative common productivity shock. It is
important to note that the eﬀects of productivity shocks are highly asymmetric when it
comes to the loan rates and the default risk. This is because a deterioration in the common
productivity level moves the threshold rightward, which leads to an immediate reduction
in the degree of uncertainty regarding ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology. After a negative shock to
Zt, the threshold takes the maximum value on impact, z¯E,1, and thereafter the ﬁnancial
intermediary can make debt contracts, knowing that the generation’s lowest technology is
z¯E,1. It follows that intra-generational technology distribution does not change from period
1 onward. If a positive productivity shock hits the economy, in contrast, the threshold
takes the minimum value on impact and then gradually goes up over time. In the latter
case, intra-generational distribution can change over time. This is why the movements of
incumbents’ default probability and loan premium are temporary when the productivity
shock is negative and persistent when it is positive.
The ﬁgures also show the total factor productivity (TFP) and the average ﬁrm tech-
nology level. In this model these two variables may diﬀer, for TFP is deﬁned as
TFPt =
∫
i∈Ωt Yt(i)di∫
i∈Ωt Lt(i)di + N
I
t fI,t + NEt fE,t
,
24The average credit spread for incumbents are raw values since it is zero in the steady state.
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while the average productivity (henceforth, AP) is given as
APt =
∫
i∈Ωt(Zt + z(i))di
Nt
.
In response to a common productivity shock, these two measures of aggregate productivity
move in tandem because Zt is a major factor for both. However, this is not necessarily the
case when it comes to other sorts of shocks. Roughly speaking, TFP deﬁned as above moves
in tandem with the aggregate output, Yt, since the denominator of TFP, the total amount
of labor, contains ﬁxed components. That is, the total amount of labor is less ﬂexible than
the linear aggregate of outputs. In contrast, AP and the aggregate output may move in
opposite directions. For example, if the mass of new entrants and the aggregate output
are simultaneously increased without changing the threshold of default, then TFP will go
up while AP will be lowered. This is because the average technology of entrants is lower
than that of incumbents.
6.2.2 A monetary policy shock: the credit rationing channel
Next, let us examine the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock. Since goods prices are ﬂexible,
the standard interest channel of monetary policy through the Euler equation does not
work here. Instead, there are two alternative channels: ﬁrst, a change in Rt inﬂuences the
household’s labor supply decision, (4), because there is a time lag between the payment and
the use of production-labor wages. I refer to this as the intensive margin eﬀect. Second,
a shift in Rt aﬀects the bank’s loan supply by changing the cost of funds. Since ﬁnancial
contracts are made in nominal terms, a change in the nominal cost of funds can change the
total amount of loans. This is an extensive margin eﬀect, which is also called the credit
rationing channel throughout the paper.
Figure 9 shows impulse responses to a (annualized) one-percent cut in the nominal
interest rate. The ﬁgure reveals that the credit rationing channel of monetary policy may
play a signiﬁcant role in the policy transmission mechanism. It turns out that a shift
in monetary policy can have signiﬁcant real eﬀects through its eﬀect on credit supply.
Although it is not clearly shown in the ﬁgure, I found that the intensive margin eﬀect is
relatively minor compared to the extensive margin eﬀect.
A cut in the nominal interest rate will lead the bank to increase credit by reducing the
cost of funds. The intuition is that a reduction in the cost of funds allows the expected
(nominal) revenue of each loan to decrease, which enables the bank to extend credit to less
creditworthy borrowers. This enlarges prospective entrants’ opportunities to obtain credit
and thus promotes ﬁrm entry. Recall that a rise in the mass of total ﬁrms exacerbates the
creditworthiness of prospective entrants by increasing the labor wages to a larger extent
than their expected proﬁts.
Figure 9 also reveals that the probability of default and the credit spreads are kept
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unchanged. This is because a shift in Rt will be oﬀset by the opposite shift in the mass
of new entrants. The quasi-expected revenue is not aﬀected at all by a change in Rt.
Thus, it can be said that the eﬀect of monetary policy has a property of intra-generational
distribution neutrality in the sense that the technology distribution within each generation
does not change over time. In the aggregate, however, a cut in the nominal interest increases
the share of low-productivity ﬁrms by increasing the fraction of new entrants. Since the
threshold is not changed, this will lower AP while increasing TFP. Monetary policy does
not ensure inter-generational distribution neutrality.
6.2.3 A financial shock
Figure 10 illustrates the impulse responses to the ﬁnancial shock, χt. Basically, a rise in
χt has similar eﬀects as a rise in Rt, except for the intensive margin eﬀect. One thing that
is diﬀerent from the policy shock is that χt can have some inﬂuence on the credit spreads.
This is simply because the minimum value of loan rates increases as χ goes up. The
intra-generational distribution neutrality still holds, but again AP ﬂuctuates according to
changes in the share of new entrants among all ﬁrms. Thus, inter-generational distribution
neutrality does not hold.
6.3 Credit crunch
Next, let us consider a situation in which “large” shocks hit the economy. There is a
possibility that the equilibrium condition (12) might not hold if a large shock hits the
economy even when the economy was previously in the steady state. If the unfavorable
shock is so large that the mass of ﬁrms cannot decline enough to attain equilibrium, then
credit will not be supplied to prospective entrants. I refer to this situation as a “credit
crunch” or “credit crisis”.
6.3.1 Impulse responses
Figure 11 shows impulse responses to a (annualized) 5% negative deviation of Zt from the
steady-state value.25 In the face of a -5% common productivity shock, the mass of new
entrants immediately takes the value of zero. Incumbents’ default risk and credit spreads
rise immediately. Accordingly, the mass of total ﬁrms and the aggregate output decline.
It is important to notice that these eﬀects are not necessarily proportional to the -1%
reduction in Zt. The term
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt + z)
αdz plays a balancer role in the loan-market
equilibrium condition as long as the mass of new entrants, NEt , takes a positive value, but
the equilibrium condition breaks down once NEt hits 0.
Figure 12 illustrates responses to an (annualized) 11% positive ﬁnancial shock. What
makes this ﬁgure qualitatively diﬀerent from ﬁgure 10 is the behavior of default probability.
25The shocks are kept as small as possible in absolute value.
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As long as shifts in χt are absorbed by a change in
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt+z)
αdz, the ﬁnancial shock
will never aﬀect default probability. However, the lack of a balancer in the loan-market
equilibrium allows the quasi-cost of funds to rise, and the thresholds of incumbents default
move rightward accordingly. This suggests that the impacts of a ﬁnancial shock and thereby
a policy shock can lead to intra-generational distribution non-neutrality when the shocks
are suﬃciently large.
6.3.2 Simulation
Thus far I have shown impulse responses of various variables given that the economy was in
the steady state. This requires relatively large shocks in order to generate a credit crunch.
In this section, I instead show long-period simulation where shocks can hit the economy
in each period. Since state variables ﬂuctuate over time, a relatively smaller shock could
trigger a credit crisis. A similar exercise can be found in the recent work by Mendoza
(2009), who solved a nonlinear problem with an occasionally binding constraint in the
context of “sudden stops”.26
I now suppose that εz and ε˜χ follow a uniform distribution on [−(1.0451/4−1), 1.0451/4−
1] and [−(1.011/4 − 1), 1.011/4 − 1], respectively. Then, εχt is deﬁned as εχt = max(0, ε˜χt ).
The nominal interest is kept constant. I run a 200-period simulation and discard the initial
100 periods.
Figure 13 illustrates a sample path of the simulation. At the time of a credit crunch,
indicated by a vertical dotted line, the loan rates and the probability of incumbents default
spike while the aggregate output, the mass of ﬁrms and the amount of credit decline sharply.
This phenomenon is consistent with the impulse responses shown above, but the diﬀerence
is that in this simulation relatively moderate shocks caused the crisis.
To see what happened shortly before and after the credit crunch, Figure 14 shows the
behavior of various variables around the crisis date (t = 0 indicates the period of the credit
crunch). It reveals that on the eve of the crisis, some variables exhibit signiﬁcant increases.
Those variables are aggregate output, mass of ﬁrms, amount of credit supplied, aggregate
labor, ﬁxed-labor wages, AP and TFP. On the other hand, some other variables, such as
new entrants’ risk premium and their default probability, are signiﬁcantly decreased on the
eve of the crisis.
The intuitive explanation of this result is as follows: suppose that the threshold of
entrants’ default is signiﬁcantly lowered in period t. This means that the next period’s
total mass will be higher than usual since most of the entrants can survive into the next
period. The increase in the mass of ﬁrms will also raise the real wages of preparatory
workers in period t + 1, other things being equal. Due to the upward pressure on real
26The importance of nonlinearity at the time of a credit crisis is also noted by He and Krishnamurthy
(2008).
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wages, the mass of new entrants needs to be reduced in period t + 1 in order to maintain
a certain degree of entrants’ creditworthiness. However, if an unfavorable shock, such as a
fall in the common technology level or a rise in the cost of funds, hits the economy in period
t + 1, then the mass of new entrants must be further reduced. If no nonnegative mass of
entrants can attain the loan-market equilibrium, then no entrants can enter the market
in period t + 1. Hitting the lower bound of NEt+1 implies that there arises a downward
rigidity of real wages, and it is this downward rigidity that prohibits the creditworthiness
of prospective entrants from improving.
It can be said that a sharp decline in the threshold has a negative externality in the
sense that it will make the following period’s ﬁrm entry more diﬃcult by creating an upward
pressure on real wages. An increase in the mass of ﬁrms itself expands the aggregate output,
but at the same time it becomes an obstacle to an improvement in the creditworthiness of
prospective ﬁrms. It should be noted that if the decrease in the threshold is signiﬁcant,
then a crisis would be caused by a very small shock that would never trigger a crisis in
normal circumstances.
The symptoms of credit crises noted above are reconﬁrmed when annualized data are
used. Figure 15 shows an annual version of Figure 14. To create the ﬁgure, I conducted a
500-period simulation 30 times and discarded the initial 100 periods in each simulation. In
total, credit crises are observed 45 times, for a frequency of about 1.5 times per 100 years.
The four-quarter means of each variable are illustrated.
On average, rises in the aggregate output, the mass of ﬁrms, the amount of credit,
aggregate labor, real wages, AP and TFP precede a credit crisis, and those variables
continue to decline in the aftermath of the crisis. In contrast, entrants’ credit spread and
the default probability signiﬁcantly decline shortly before the crisis, whereas they recover
rapidly after it. The result that a credit crunch is likely to follow a credit boom is consistent
with empirical studies such as Keeton (1999), Jime´nez and Saurina (2006) and Mendoza
and Terrones (2008). Keeton (1999) and Jime´nez and Saurina (2006) report that there is
a positive, although lagged, relationship between credit growth and credit risk. Mendoza
and Terrones (2008) also show that credit booms tend to be preceded by periods of high
TFP in industrialized countries. Although they do not emphasize the role of real wages in
credit boom-bust cycles, the above model suggests that downward wage rigidity may be a
key to explaining how credit booms end and crises begin.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper explored a situation in which ﬁrms have to borrow funds from a ﬁnancial
intermediary in order to cover ﬁxed costs. It is shown that credit rationing arises in
equilibrium, and thus the mass of new entry ﬁrms depends on the volume of credit the
ﬁnancial intermediaries can supply.
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It turns out that a cut in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the credit
supply as long as debt contracts are made in nominal terms. The main diﬀerences in
the transmission mechanism between the balance sheet channel, the bank lending channel
and the credit rationing channel are summarized in Table 4. The credit rationing channel
and the balance sheet channel are similar in that the key policy variable is an interest
rate and borrower’s creditworthiness plays a crucial role in policy transmission. On the
other hand, the credit rationing channel and the bank lending channel share the property
that the presence of rationing is a key to the policy transmission mechanism while the
sources of supply shortage are diﬀerent. The traditional balance sheet channel emphasizes
that a shift in monetary policy has real eﬀects through its inﬂuence on the borrowers’ net
worth. However, it only focuses on a demand-driven eﬀect of monetary policy, neglecting
the presence of ﬁnancial market disequilibrium. If credit demand is greater than credit
supply, which is more likely for younger ﬁrms, then monetary policy can have real eﬀects
through a supply-side channel as opposed to a demand-side channel.
Since the model can be solved without relying on any linearization technique, the
condition for the loan market equilibrium is allowed to occasionally break down. The
bank’s loan supply to new ﬁrms suddenly stops when the equilibrium condition is not
satisﬁed. I showed that a credit crisis is likely to occur after a sharp rise in the aggregate
output, the mass of ﬁrms, the amount of credit supplied, the aggregate labor, ﬁxed-labor
wages, AP and TFP. On the other hand, both new entrants’ premium and their default
probability tend to be signiﬁcantly decreased on the eve of a credit crunch. These ﬁndings
suggest that a credit crisis would occur when the economy is in boom rather than in
recession, a result conﬁrmed by existing empirical studies.
The following topics should be addressed in future research: ﬁrst, it is necessary to
clarify the quantitative importance of the credit rationing channel. To do this, more
empirical works will be needed to quantify the size of type-D credit rationing. Second,
capital accumulation is absent in this paper. It would be useful to see how the introduction
of capital aﬀects the results. The challenge is that one needs to solve a forward-looking
problem with an occasionally holding equilibrium in a model where the distribution of
productivity levels changes over time. Such a nonlinear forward-looking problem with
heterogeneous agents seems quite important in order to better understand credit crises.
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8 Appendix: The steady state
The steady states of z¯E,t, {z¯1+qI,t }tq=1, xE,t, {xqI,t}tq=1,
∫ zu
0 Jt(z)(Zt + z)
αdz,
∫ zu
0 Ht(z)(Zt +
z)αdz, NEt , N It , Nt, Yt, dt(z¯E), W˜E,t/Pt, W˜I,t/Pt, RlE,t and {Rq,lI,t}tq=1 are as follows:
Threshold for entrants: z¯E =
αzu − μEZ
α + μE
,
Threshold for incumbents: z¯1+qI = z¯E ≡ z¯I ,
Prob. of entrants’ default: xE =
z¯E
zu
,
Prob. of incumbents’ default: xqI = 0,
Productivity (total):
∫ zu
0
J(z)(Z + z)αdz =
Γ(z¯E ;Z)
Rθη˜γf1+φ˜E
,
Productivity (incumbents):
∫ zu
z¯I
H(z)(Z + z)αdz = N I
∫ zu
z¯I
g(z)
1−G(z¯I)(Z + z)
αdz,
Mass of entrants: NE =
δ
1− δN
I ,
Mass of incumbents: N I =
∫ zu
0
J(z)(Z + z)αdz
×
(∫ zu
z¯I
g(z)
1−G(z¯I)(Z + z)
αdz +
δ
1− δ
∫ zu
0
g(z)(Z + z)αdz
)−1
,
Total mass: N = N I + NE,
Aggregate output: Y =
[(
θ
θ − 1
)
γηR
] −1
1+φ
[∫ zu
0
J(z)(Z + z)αdz
] 1
α
,
Threshold proﬁts: d(z¯E) =
1
θ
(Z + z¯E)α
[(
θ
θ − 1
)
γηR
] −1
1+φ
[∫ zu
0
J(z)(Z + z)αdz
] 1−α
α
,
Real wage (entrants):
W˜E
P
= η˜γY f φ˜E,
Real wage (incumbents):
W˜I
P
= η˜γY f φ˜I ,
Loan rate (entrants): RlE =
d(z¯E)
(W˜E/P )fE
,
Loan rate (incumbents): Rq,lI = R.
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Table 1: Availability of credit from the main bank
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Credit application was refused or its amount re-
duced (among applicants)
8.6 8.8 6 6.8 9.2
Credit application was accepted with tightened
borrowing conditions (among applicants)
18.1 17.8 15.8 15.9 17.2
Did not submit credit application in the past
year
43 50.9 46.7 49.7 48.7
Source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises, The Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises
Agency.
Table 2: Availability of credit and the source of funds by developmental phase
early growth growth and expansion stable total
Availability of credit
Obtained funds as desired 61.3 87.9 97.4 93.9
Did not obtain funds as desired 38.7 12.1 2.6 6.1
Source of funds
Financial institutions 82.9 91.3 91.9 91.3
Representative/executives 68.6 28.7 19.2 24.3
Venture capital 45.7 16.2 10.3 13.7
Business partners/aﬃliated companies 28.6 13.0 11.9 13.1
Relatives/acquaintances 35.2 13.0 11.0 12.9
Company funds (cash ﬂow) 17.1 22.0 27.4 25.5
Source: White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009, The Ministry of Small and Medium
Enterprises Agency. The questionnaire was conducted by Tokyo Shoko Research Ltd.
Note: Only for SMEs that conduct R&D.
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Table 3: What has made external ﬁnance diﬃcult?
Deterioration in the business condition of the related industry 50.6
Deterioration in the company’s proﬁtability 46.4
Financial institutions’ problems 43.8
Deterioration in the asset value of the company and/or the manager 14.2
Others 3.6
Source: White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009, The Ministry of Small and Medium
Enterprises Agency. The questionnaire was conducted by Mizuho Research Institute.
Note: Based on the questionnaire to the SMEs that replied that loans from ﬁnancial institutions have
become tighter than before.
Table 4: Classiﬁcation of the credit channels
BS BL CR
key policy variable interest rate money supply interest rate
credit rationing? no yes yes
source of rationing n.a. bank liquidity creditworthiness
Note: BS, BL and CR denote the balance-sheet channel, the bank-lending channel and the credit rationing
channel, respectively.
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Figure 1: Diﬀusion indices regarding the external ﬁnance conditions of SMEs
Source: TANKAN, Bank of Japan.
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Figure 2: Easiness in external ﬁnance, ﬁrm entry and ﬁxed investment
Source: DI and ﬁxed investment: TANKAN, Bank of Japan. Number of newly registered ﬁrms: White
paper on Small and Medium Enterprises 2009, The Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency.
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Figure 4: Graphical illustration of equilibrium credit rationing
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Figure 5: Determination of z¯1+qI,t+1 when incumbents are risky borrowers
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Figure 6: Determination of z¯1+qI,t+1 when incumbents are safe borrowers
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